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INTRODUCTION
Kevin Euceda1 was forcibly recruited by the MS-13 gang when he
was just thirteen years old. Kevin was destitute after being abandoned by
his parents in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, and the gang commandeered his
house as a base of operations and compelled his participation in gang
activities.2 Over the years, Kevin was forced into minor roles in the gang’s
*
David Baluarte is a Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Immigrant
Rights Clinic at Washington and Lee University School of Law (W&L IRC). Baluarte would
like to thank Anna Welch and Maureen Sweeney for their feedback on drafts of this article
and Luke Millar for his excellent research assistance. He would like to thank Matt Boaz,
W&L IRC supervising attorney and co-counsel for Kevin, for his input. Baluarte would also
like to thank all the student attorneys from the W&L IRC who represented Kevin over the
years, with special thanks to Hollie Webb, Fiorella Herrera, Garner Stapp, Micaela Owens,
Erick Resek, and Marissa Baer.
1. This Article is dedicated to Kevin, a warm hearted, kind soul who did not deserve
his lot in life and who was taken from this world too early. Kevin authorized his counsel to
use his real name while working with Hannah Dryer at the Washington Post to complete the
coverage cited below. See infra note 2. Kevin authorized the use of his real name, in part,
because he wanted to publicize the injustices he suffered in the United States immigration
system. This Article lifts up his name posthumously to honor his desire to publicize his
mistreatment by United States authorities.
2. Hannah Dryer, Trust and consequences: The government required him to see a
therapist. He thought his words would be confidential. Now, the traumatized migrant may be
deported., WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/
national/immigration-therapy-reports-ice/ [https://perma.cc/9GF6-C3WX].
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criminal enterprise, and on a couple of occasions was obligated to engage in
violence.3 These violent acts haunted Kevin and left him severely
traumatized.4 Kevin endured life under the thumb of the violent gang until
he was seventeen, when he seized a rare chance to escape.5 He fled
Honduras, traversing dangerous migratory channels through Guatemala and
Mexico to arrive in the United States, where he believed he could find
protection.6 His trauma was evident when he arrived in the United States,
leading immigration officers to medicate him, require counseling, and place
him on suicide watch.7 Unbeknownst to Kevin at that time, an arduous legal
battle awaited him that he would be forced to wage from detention centers
throughout the United States because of his perceived dangerousness.8
While his legal case was strong in many respects, he ended up being unable
to endure the cost of the fight, jailed like a criminal in immigration
detention for the three years that his lawyers worked to secure protection in
the United States.9 Over this period, a judge’s decision to award him
asylum was reversed, and her orders to release Kevin from detention were
twice blocked by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).10 Kevin
accepted deportation to Honduras as his only escape from detention while
his case continued to languish in a seemingly endless process.11 He met an
untimely death in an accident just months later.12
Kevin faced many impediments to refugee protection in the United
States.13 This Article focuses on the government’s insistence that Kevin
should be barred from refugee protection because he committed “serious
nonpolitical crimes” as a member of MS-13. The serious nonpolitical crime
bar originates from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(“Refugee Convention”) and it excludes from protection any person who

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Hannah Dryer, To stay or to go? Amid coronavirus outbreaks, migrants face the
starkest of choices: Risking their lives in U.S. detention or returning home to the dangers
they fled, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/12/
26/immigration-detention-covid-deportation/ [https://perma.cc/8M29-3JZ7].
12. Id.
13. Other than the serious nonpolitical crime bar, Kevin faced challenges establishing
a well-founded fear on account of a protected characteristic. More specifically, Kevin
alleged that he was the member of a particular social group of “former MS-13 members,”
which the BIA has found does not constitute a basis for refugee protection. W-G-R-, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014). While Kevin was able to distinguish his case from that precedent
before the Immigration Judge, who awarded Kevin asylum, the BIA reversed that decision
and remanded to the IJ.

408

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 2

had committed a serious crime outside the country of asylum.14 The United
States incorporated this exclusion into United States law with the 1980
Refugee Act,15 legislation ostensibly intended to bring the country into
compliance with its international obligations under the Refugee
Convention.16 Under case law, the application of the bar requires
“balanc[ing] the seriousness of the criminal acts against the political aspect
of the conduct to determine whether the criminal nature of the applicant’s
acts outweighs their political character.”17 In Kevin’s case, where the
crimes MS-13 compelled him to commit were relatively serious and not at
all political in nature, the application of the serious nonpolitical crime bar
might have been appropriate. But the fact that Kevin committed those
crimes in fear for his life suggests that a different outcome should be
possible. However, no duress exception to the serious nonpolitical crime
bar has been established under United States law.
The United States has an international legal obligation to permit
Kevin and other asylum seekers like him to present a duress defense against
the imposition of the serious nonpolitical crime bar. This obligation is
derived from the Refugee Convention itself, which has been interpreted by
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”),18 international
refugee law scholars,19 and states party to the Refugee Convention to
include an implicit duress exception.20 It is well documented that the
objective of the Refugee Convention, promulgated to manage the
humanitarian disaster in the wake of World War II, was to extend
international protection to refugees who could not find safe harbor in their
home countries.21 The exceptions to refugee protection were intended to
14. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
15. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 208(b)(2)(A)(iii), 241(b)(3)(B)(iii) bar an
individual from obtaining asylum and withholding of removal, respectively, if “there are
serious reasons for believing that the alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside
the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States.”
16. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438–39 (1987); see also INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999) (citing Cardoza-Fonseca in finding that “one of
Congress’ primary purposes in passing the Refugee Act was to implement the principles
agreed to in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . to
which the United States acceded in 1968 . . . ”).
17. E-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A. 2012) (citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 415).
18. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05 (Sept. 4, 2003).
19. See Geoff Gilbert, Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses,
UNHCR 33 (2001), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3b3702152.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2BM
-833B]; see also JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 218–20 (Anne Lynas
Shah ed., 1991).
20. See infra notes 166–70.
21. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (Dec. 2010), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10 [https://perma.cc/
9K5N-X436].
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exclude those who perpetrated harmful acts that contravened the
humanitarian purpose of the treaty.22
Considering the humanitarian objective of refugee protection, and
the human rights context in which it was developed, it goes to reason that
criminal exclusion from the protection framework should be tethered to
actual criminal culpability.23 Indeed, where a refugee was compelled by his
persecutors to act criminally, it is necessary to examine the refugee’s
culpability in that context and determine whether protection is appropriate
to truly achieve the humanitarian purpose of the protection framework.24
Any other interpretation would be unfaithful to the goals of the Refugee
Convention and the intent of the United States Congress when it
implemented the 1980 Refugee Act in furtherance of those goals.25
Kevin’s case provides an excellent example of why such an
exception must exist. Indeed, anyone who spent any time with Kevin
instantly understood that he was a victim of MS-13, that he had been
forcibly recruited in fear, and that any actions he took on the gang’s behalf
were to save himself from torture or death. This was evident to every
counselor that met with Kevin, his many lawyers, a journalist that worked
closely with him, and perhaps most importantly, the Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) that heard Kevin’s testimony under oath.26 However, the DHS never
accepted that Kevin could be anything but a dangerous criminal,
notwithstanding all the evidence to the contrary, and the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found that characterization to be conclusive
when it excluded him from refugee protection without a serious
examination of his actual criminal culpability.27 This refusal to consider
Kevin’s duress defense to the application of the serious nonpolitical crime
bar and examine his actual criminal culpability in a manner consistent with
the humanitarian goals that United States asylum law was intended to serve
resulted in Kevin’s death.28 This is far too common, and it must change.
This Article will argue for the incorporation of a duress exception
to the serious nonpolitical crime bar in four parts. First, this Article
illustrates the original intent of United States asylum law to implement
Refugee Convention obligations, and the divergence of United States
practice from that original intent through a discussion of two seminal

22. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05 (Sept. 4, 2003).
23. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on Their
Application ¶ 75 (Dec. 1996).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee
Protections From Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179 (1994).
26. Dryer, supra note 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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asylum law cases, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca29 and INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre.30
Next, this Article summarizes the current state of the law surrounding the
serious nonpolitical crime bar, which the United States Supreme Court
interpreted in a restrictive manner in Aguirre-Aguirre, setting up the current
challenge to pleading a duress defense to that bar.31 Third, this Article
examines the controversy around the existence of a duress exception to the
persecutor bar, arguing that the BIA has appropriately interpreted that bar to
include a duress exception that should extend to the serious nonpolitical
crime bar by analogy. Finally, this Article argues that United States law
must be read in a manner consistent with international law and incorporate
a duress defense into the serious nonpolitical crime bar, and that a failure to
do so degrades the rule of law by permitting the executive to undermine the
will of Congress. The conclusion will emphasize the need for a duress
defense to the serious nonpolitical crime bar so that refugees like Kevin can
receive the protection guaranteed under United States law.
I. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
In 1968, the United States ratified the 1967 Protocol to the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees, which bound the United States to the
obligations set forth in the Refugee Convention.32 When the United States
Congress passed the Refugee Act in 1980, it was unequivocal in its intent to
bring the United States into compliance with the international obligations it
had taken on with its ratification of the 1967 Protocol.33 In this regard, the
Refugee Act created a unique legislative mandate requiring both the agency
charged with its implementation and courts that review those efforts to read
that statute in a manner consistent with international law.34 However,
United States agencies and courts are unaccustomed to applying
international law domestically and have been increasingly less inclined to
do so since the passage of the Refugee Act. This section illustrates this shift
with a discussion of two United States Supreme Court cases, INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca35 and INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,36 and highlights the
consequences for refugees seeking protection in the United States.

29. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
30. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
31. Id.
32. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267.
33. See Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980); see also Caitlin B.
Munley, The Refugee Act of 1980 and INS v. Cardora-Fonseca, 27 GEO IMMIGR. L. J. 809,
810 (2013) (citing S. REP. NO. 96-256).
34. See Munley, supra note 33, at 810; see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424.
35. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 421.
36. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 415.
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In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,37 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the statutory language “well-founded fear of persecution” that is
central to the refugee definition, incorporated directly into United States
law from the Refugee Convention.38 The case arose from Luz Marina
Cardoza-Fonseca’s application for asylum, in which she alleged that
Nicaraguan Sandinistas would imprison and torture her in order to gain
information about her brother, who was a political dissident in Nicaragua.39
In considering her claim for refugee protection, first the IJ and then the BIA
applied a standard that required her to demonstrate that she would “more
likely than not” suffer the persecution she alleged.40 The United States
Supreme Court disagreed with this standard, finding that a one-in-ten
chance of persecution could qualify as the “well-founded fear” required to
establish eligibility for asylum pursuant to the 1980 Refugee Act.41
There were several very compelling reasons for the Court to decide
Cardoza-Fonseca the way it did.42 This discussion will focus on the Court’s
consideration of “the abundant evidence of an intent to conform the
definition of ‘refugee’ and our asylum law to the United Nations’s Protocol
to which the United States has been bound since 1968.”43 This evidence
included both the statutory language, much of which was imported directly
from the Refugee Convention, as well as congressional statements made
during the legislative debate. For example, the Court highlighted the
Conference Committee Report stating that the refugee definition was
accepted “with the understanding that it is based directly upon the language
of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent
with the Protocol.”44 With the link between the statutory language of the
1980 Refugee Act and the 1951 Refugee Convention firmly established, the
Court proceeded to consider sources that would provide content for the
otherwise ambiguous “well-founded fear” language.45 Those sources
included the history of the 1951 Convention, the UNHCR Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (“UNHCR
Handbook”), and the writings of international refugee law scholars.46
Regarding the history of the 1951 Convention, the Court
highlighted the roots of the Refugee Convention definition in the
International Refugee Organization (IRO) Constitution. Specifically, the
Court illustrated how the drafters of the IRO Constitution intended the well37. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 421.
38. Id. at 439–40.
39. Id. at 424–25.
40. Id. at 425.
41. Id. at 449.
42. Id. at 432–33.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 437 (citing S. REP. NO. 96-590, at 20 (1980); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-608,
at 9 (1979)).
45. Id. at 436–41.
46. Id. at 431, 436–41.
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founded fear inquiry to include persons who can “show good reason why he
fears persecution,” and that the 1951 Convention drafters intended to
incorporate this same standard.47 The Court found additional support for
this lower burden in the UNHCR Handbook, which urged protection for a
person “if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in
his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in
the definition . . . .”48 Finally, the Court noted that its examination of the
refugee definition history, corroborated by the UNHCR Handbook, was
further supported by the work of refugee law scholars.49 In fact, the Court
specifically concluded that a ten percent chance of persecution could
qualify as a “well-founded fear” based on the writing of A. Grahl-Madsen
in his 1966 treatise, The Status of Refugees in International Law.50
While none of these international law sources were dispositive, it is
evident that the Court understood its role to identify the applicable rule of
international refugee law, because that was the rule that Congress intended
to govern. Accordingly, the Court examined the history of the Refugee
Convention, the UNHCR Handbook, and the writings of refugee law
scholars to answer the question of what standard of proof international
refugee law required. Once it settled on a one in ten chance, it concluded
that must be the standard in the United States as well.51
Just over a decade after the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Cardoza-Fonseca, it considered the proper interpretation of the serious
nonpolitical crime bar in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre.52 The High Court’s view
of international law had dimmed, as evidenced by the very different
approach it took to interpret the meaning of that provision of United States
law, clearly derived directly from the Refugee Convention.53 In that case,
Aguirre sought refugee protection based on his fears that he would be
persecuted for his political activity in Guatemala, which included
participation in strikes over rising bus fares and the failure of the
government to investigate student disappearances.54 The IJ granted asylum,
but the BIA reversed, concluding that Aguirre’s conduct during protests,
which included burning buses, breaking store windows, and attacking store
customers, bus passengers, and police officers, constituted serious
nonpolitical crimes.55
On review, the Ninth Circuit found that the BIA had applied an
incorrect standard, citing an additional consideration from the UNHCR
Handbook requiring the BIA to balance the seriousness of the criminal
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 438.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 439, 440 n. 24.
Id. at 431, 449.
Id.
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
Id. at 427.
Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 422–23.
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conduct against the severity of the persecution feared.56 This additional
consideration suggested that proportionality was a relevant factor in
deciding whether to apply the bar to protection, such that more serious
crimes may be permitted if the persecution feared was more severe.57
However, on review, the Supreme Court held that the BIA was not required
to follow UNHCR Handbook interpretations when deciding the scope of
United States asylum protection.58
In Aguirre-Aguirre, no one disputed that it was appropriate for the
court to “weigh the political nature of an act against its common-law or
criminal character” in deciding whether to apply the serious nonpolitical
crime bar.59 Rather, the Supreme Court focused on the Ninth Circuit’s
conclusion that the BIA was also required to follow additional guidance in
the UNHCR Handbook. The Court first concluded that it owed Chevron60
deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the scope of the serious nonpolitical
crime bar.61 The Court then found error in the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion
that the BIA was required to balance the crimes against the threat of
persecution by simply referencing a previous BIA case in which the Board
concluded that there was no support in the text of the statute for that
balancing.62 While the UNHCR Handbook provided that this balancing was
appropriate, the Supreme Court found that the Handbook was “not binding
on the Attorney General, the BIA, or United States courts.”63 Notably, the
BIA had never considered the intent of Congress to comply with
international refugee law obligations, and the Supreme Court did not
require compliance with this legislative mandate.64
Professor Bassina Farbenblum observed the Court’s shift regarding
its application of international law in these two seminal cases in her
challenge to the Court’s utilization of the Chevron doctrine in cases
interpreting United States refugee law obligations.65 Professor Farbenblum
found Cardoza-Fonseca significant both because the Court clearly
understood its role in interpreting United States asylum law in a manner
consistent with the Refugee Convention and because it did not defer to the

56. Id. at 423.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 427.
59. Id. at 423.
60. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
61. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424–25.
62. Id. at 425 (citing Rodriguez–Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209–210 (B.I.A. 1985),
which “reject[ed] any interpretation of the phras[e] . . . ‘serious nonpolitical crime’ in [§
1253(h)(2)(C)] which would vary with the nature of evidence of persecution”).
63. Id. at 427 (citing INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439, n. 22, when the
Supreme Court wrote that “[w]e do not suggest, of course, that the explanation of the U.N.
Handbook has the force of law or in any way binds the INS . . . ”).
64. Id. at 422–23; 427.
65. See Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law:
Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 Dᴜᴋᴇ L.J. 1059, 1078–91 (2011).
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agency’s interpretation of the statute.66 As to the latter point, she
emphasized that Justice Stevens authored Cardoza-Fonseca and Chevron
three years earlier, and clearly distinguished the two cases. Specifically, the
Court in Cardoza-Fonseca found the interpretation of a “well-founded fear”
to be “a pure question of statutory construction,” which is distinguished
from the “complex policy judgment about how to fill a statutory gap” at
issue in Chevron.67 Professor Farbenblum then critiqued the Supreme
Court’s failure to retain this distinction in Aguirre-Aguirre.68
In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Supreme Court utilized a Chevron
framework to analyze an apparent pure question of statutory construction
because “the agency was ‘giv[ing] ambiguous statutory terms concrete
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.”’69 Professor
Farbenblum astutely observed both the malleability of the Court’s
previously articulated Chevron distinction and, most important for the
present discussion, that “[t]he Court made no attempt to determine the
meaning of ‘serious [non]political crime’ in Article 1F(b) under
international law.”70 Indeed, the Court in Aguirre-Aguirre addressed the
narrow question of whether the UNHCR Handbook is binding on the
agency and ended its analysis once it answered that question in the
negative. The Court did not inquire whether the UNHCR Handbook
guidance was expressive of international refugee law, and had it asked and
answered that question in the affirmative, it would have likely changed the
outcome of the case under the reasoning of Cardoza-Fonseca.
Nothing in Aguirre-Aguirre forecloses a renewed effort to urge
courts to read the serious nonpolitical crime bar in conformity with
international refugee law. That case stands for the rule that the BIA is not
required to follow the UNHCR Handbook, but it does not undermine the
Cardoza-Fonseca Court’s conclusion that Congress intended United States
asylum law to conform to international refugee law obligations. However,
the stark contrast between the Supreme Court’s approach in these two cases
provides compelling evidence that it is less inclined to read United States
asylum law in conformity with international law, Congressional intent
notwithstanding. The following section provides a more fulsome account of
the current state of law on the serious nonpolitical crime bar, confirming
that a return to an interpretive canon that prioritizes the original intent of
Congress in passing the Refugee Act is still possible.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1086–87.
Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1089–92.
Id. at 1089 (citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425) (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
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II. THE SERIOUS NONPOLITICAL CRIME BAR
As noted previously, an individual is barred from obtaining refugee
protection in the United States if “there are serious reasons for believing
that the [noncitizen] committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the
United States prior to the arrival of the [noncitizen] in the United States.”71
This bar to protection was directly incorporated from Article 1F of the
Refugee Convention, which excludes from the ambit of convention
protection any person for whom there are serious reason to believe has
committed: (a) a crime against peace, war crime, or crime against
humanity;72 (b) a serious nonpolitical crime;73 or (c) acts contrary to the
purposes and principle of the United Nations.74 These exclusion clauses
were incorporated into United States law after the United States subjected
itself to the convention framework with its ratification of the 1967
Protocol.75 This section examines the current scope of the serious
nonpolitical crime bar and highlights some key challenges to interpreting
the bar in a manner consistent with the Refugee Convention, as intended by
Congress.
The BIA first considered the applicability of the serious
nonpolitical crime bar in Matter of Rodriguez-Palma, which involved an
asylum seeker from Cuba who admitted to committing a robbery in Cuba
before his arrival in the United States.76 This case was decided the same
year that the Refugee Act was enacted. Accordingly, the Board’s
consideration of the serious nonpolitical crime bar was an issue of first
impression.77 Noting both the intent of Congress to implement United
States obligations under the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention and
the lack of any clarification of the scope of the bar in the Convention or the
Protocol, the Board looked first to the UNHCR Handbook.78 The BIA cited
the Handbook, which provided that “a serious crime must be a capital crime
or a very grave punishable act” and that the gravity of the crime should be
weighed against the persecution feared.79 The BIA decided to apply the bar
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1980).
72. Refugee Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(F)(a). The full text of exclusion 1F(a) is
“He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes.”
73. Id. The full text of exclusion 1F(b) is “He has committed a serious non-political
crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee.”
74. Id. The full text of exclusion 1F(c) is “He has been guilty of acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.”
75. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
76. 17 I. & N. Dec. 465, 466 (B.I.A. 1980).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 468.
79. Id. (citing U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 155–56 (Sept. 1979)).
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and stated that it would reach the same result whether based on the nature
of the crime alone or balanced against the persecution feared.80 The BIA
emphasized that robbery was a crime involving moral turpitude,
criminalized under common law and statute, and “characterized as a grave,
serious, aggravated, infamous, and heinous crime.”81 The BIA also
concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Rodriguez-Palma would
suffer persecution in Cuba, so “assuming arguendo” that a balancing test
was appropriate, it was still appropriate to apply the bar.82
It is notable that the Board never approached the UNHCR
Handbook as a binding interpretive source, but rather a useful one. Worth
highlighting is the BIA’s failure to appreciate its mandate to interpret
United States asylum law in a manner consistent with the Refugee
Convention.83 Indeed, it decided not to require the proportionality test
advanced in the UNHCR Handbook, not because it did not believe that test
was expressive of a Convention obligation, but because it questioned
whether such a proportionality test was advisable.84 Of course, this is the
same Board that applied a heightened burden of proof in Cardoza-Fonseca,
which was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court due, in part, to its
failure to comply with international law.85
Where the BIA expressed uncertainty about the applicability of the
UNHCR Handbook in Matter of Rodriguez-Palma, it ignored that guidance
altogether in Matter of McMullen when it applied the bar to a former
member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (“PIRA”).86 McMullen
had provided military training and conducted special operations, including
arms purchases and shipments as a feature of his membership in the PIRA,
a group widely recognized for its use of violent terrorist tactics in
furtherance of its political objectives.87 The BIA found that McMullen did
not fear persecution on account of his political opinion and then went on to
find that the serious nonpolitical crime bar applied.88 Specifically, the BIA
invoked the balancing test previously set forth in Rodriguez-Palma,
considering whether “the political aspect of the offense outweigh[s] its
common-law character.”89 The BIA stated that conduct would trigger the
bar if it was atrocious in nature or if “the crime is grossly out of proportion
to the political objective,” and ultimately found that McMullen’s criminal

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. 469–70.
See id. 468–70.
Id. 468–69.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
See McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 92–94 (B.I.A. 1984).
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 94–99.
Id. at 97–98.
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conduct was both atrocious in nature and disproportionate to his political
objectives.90
The BIA’s reference to the UNHCR Handbook in Rodriguez-Palma
and its subsequent failure to specifically analyze its obligations under
international refugee law in McMullen set up the Supreme Court battle over
the scope of the serious nonpolitical crime bar in Aguirre-Aguirre. As was
noted above, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision to
require the BIA to apply the proportionality test mentioned in RodriguezPalma.91 Since Aguirre-Aguirre, there have been few efforts to reassert
international refugee law as the appropriate framework for interpreting the
serious nonpolitical crime bar under United States law.
The BIA’s current approach to the serious nonpolitical crime bar is
to first examine whether the crime is “serious” and then “balance the
seriousness of the criminal acts against the political aspect of the conduct to
determine whether the criminal nature of the applicant’s acts outweighs
their political character.”92 This approach is set forth in the BIA’s 2012 case
Matter of E-A-,93 which concerned the asylum claim of a man from Côte
d’Ivoire who had perpetrated certain abuses as a member of the youth group
of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (“PDCI”).94 He testified that he
was instructed by party leaders to “make trouble” at opposition party
events, and that he “burned passenger buses and cars, threw stones, pushed
baskets of food off the heads of merchants as they walked on the streets,
and threw merchandise off of merchants’ tables in the market.”95
In analyzing whether this constituted a serious nonpolitical crime,
the BIA emphasized that the first step is to ask “whether the criminal
conduct is of an atrocious nature,” inasmuch as a finding that the conduct is
atrocious would trigger the application of the bar without further analysis.96
The BIA found that the conduct was not atrocious and moved on to balance
the criminal nature against the political nature of the conduct.97 In so doing,
the BIA considered “whether (1) the act or acts were directed at a
governmental entity or political organization, as opposed to a private or
civilian entity; (2) they were directed toward modification of the political
organization of the State; and (3) there is a close and direct causal link

90. Id. at 98. Notably, the BIA analogized case law on the applicability of the political
offense exception to extradition without any clear basis for doing so, reasoning that
McMullen’s likely ineligibility for that exception reinforced its decision to apply the serious
nonpolitical crime bar. Id. at 98–99.
91. INS. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 416 (1999).
92. E-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A. 2012) (citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 429–
31).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id. at 4–5.
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between the crime and its political purpose.”98 In applying this analytical
framework, the BIA noted the similarity between the conduct at issue in
Matter of E-A- and Aguirre-Aguirre, and that the main distinction was
testimony that no one was physically injured.99 However, the BIA found
that physical injury was not necessary to apply the bar, particularly where
the conduct is “highly dangerous” and places “innocent people at
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.”100 Ultimately, the BIA
applied the bar in Matter of E-A-.101
In the context of the BIA’s discussion, it addressed the applicant’s
contention that he had only participated in the criminal activity under
duress.102 While it ultimately rejected this argument because it was “not
based on any specific, credible threat or any evidence that such actions had
been carried out on others similarly situated to him,”103 the BIA’s reasoned
consideration of coercion as part of its analysis is cause for cautious
optimism.104 The final section of this Article will present a complete
argument that international refugee law requires a duress exception to the
serious nonpolitical crime bar. Before setting forth that argument, the next
section considers the analogous controversy around a duress exception to
the persecutor bar.
III. THE TRAIL BLAZED IN THE PERSECUTOR BAR CONTROVERSY
The current debate about the existence of a duress exception to the
1F exclusion clauses began in earnest in the United States with Negusie v.
Holder, decided by the United States Supreme Court in 2009.105 United
States law bars from refugee protection any noncitizen who participated in
the persecution of others, and Negusie arose from a BIA decision to apply
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 4–5.
100. Id. at 5.
101. Id. at 8.
102. Id. at 7 (citing Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 369 (6th Cir. 2010), where
the court affirmed the finding that the applicant was not coerced into committing serious
nonpolitical crimes as a member of a gang while a juvenile).
103. Id. at 7–8.
104. See Fatma Marouf, Invoking Federal Common Law Defenses in Immigration
Cases, 66 UCLA L. REV. 142, 189–90 (2019) (observing that “the BIA’s decision [in
Matter of E-A-] is promising insofar as it acknowledges that duress and self-defense are
relevant to the serious nonpolitical crime analysis . . . [but] the BIA’s decision does not
explicitly describe duress or self-defense as affirmative common law defenses or explain
their elements). Contrastingly, in Berhane v. Holder, the criminal conduct in question—
throwing rocks during a protest—was found by the Sixth Circuit to be insufficient
justification for the bar, especially considering the justifications offered by the applicant:
political motive and self-defense. 606 F.3d 819, 825 (6th Cir. 2010) (“That Berhane’s acts
were comparatively less violent than [the cases described above] does not inoculate him
from the serious-nonpolitical-crime bar, but it does suggest that the Board ought to explain
why he falls on the wrong side of the line—if indeed he does.”).
105. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
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the so-called persecutor bar to Daniel Negusie, an Eritrean man who had
served as a guard in a prison camp against his will.106 On review at the Fifth
Circuit, that court upheld the BIA’s application of a longstanding rule
derived from Fedorenko v. United States that voluntariness was not a
consideration in applying the persecutor bar.107 The Supreme Court
reviewed the history of the persecutor bar and determined that the BIA
improperly relied on Fedorenko in finding that there was no duress
exception.108 Specifically, the Court found that Fedorenko arose from a
prior version of refugee protection established by the 1948 Displaced
Persons Act (“DPA”), where Negusie’s application for protection arose
under the modern asylum regime promulgated with the 1980 Refugee
Act.109 Accordingly, the Court concluded that it was improper to apply the
statutory prohibition on a duress exception from Fedorenko in Negusie’s
case.110 The Supreme Court remanded the question to the BIA for
consideration under the appropriate statutory framework.111
It took nine years for the BIA to address the issue in the first
instance, and the duress exception became the subject of scholarly
examination in the interim.112 Professor Kate Evans explored the
international and domestic origins of the persecutor bar and concluded that
a duress exception under United States law was appropriate.113 Professor
Evans argued that the International Refugee Organization (IRO)
Constitution, international refugee agreements, and decisions of military
tribunals informed the work of Congress in formulating the persecutor bar,
and those sources supported a duress exception.114 Professor Evans’s
insights were not limited to answering the question posed by the Negusie
Court; rather, her examination of IRO documents preserved in the French
National Archive revealed that voluntariness was clearly a consideration in
early persecutor bar adjudications.115 Because the IRO Constitution
included a duress exception to the persecutor bar and the DPA incorporated
that provision from the IRO Constitution, Professor Evans argued that the
DPA should have included such an exception and the Fedorenko Court
erred in concluding otherwise.116 Professor Evans demonstrated that the
1951 Refugee Convention was intended to incorporate both the persecutor
106. Id. at 515.
107. Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Fedorenko v.
United States, 499 U.S. 490 (1981)).
108. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522–23.
109. Id. at 524 (explaining that the DPA and INA had “different textual structures . . . .
and [are] different statute[s] enacted for a different purpose”).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 524–25.
112. Kate Evans, Drawing Lines Among the Persecuted, 101 MINN. L. REV. 453 (2016).
113. Id. at 457–59.
114. Id. at 460.
115. Id. at 487–510.
116. Id. at 511–15.
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bar and its duress exception from the IRO Convention, and that the United
States Congress intended to include those international obligations in the
1980 Refugee Act.117 In this manner, Professor Evans provided valuable
guidance to the BIA, which was set to resolve the question posed by the
Supreme Court in Negusie.
When the BIA ultimately decided Matter of Negusie118 on remand,
it concluded that the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol
implicitly included a duress defense, “limited in nature,” and that it was
therefore appropriate to read a duress defense into United States law. 119 The
BIA first reasoned that Congress had intended to bring United States law
into alignment with its international refugee law obligations when it passed
the Refugee Act, and more specifically that it had intended to implement
the Article 1F(a) exclusion clause in the form of the persecutor bar.120 The
BIA then examined Article 1F(a), and found that the persecutor bar was
intended to remove from the ambit of protection persons who had
perpetrated crimes against humanity or war crimes, and examined that body
of international criminal law for guidance.121 The BIA quickly concluded
that international criminal tribunals in the post-war era understood “that
persons could not be held individually responsible for executing an order
unless they had the ability to make a moral choice.”122 A duress defense
was consistent with that spirit and was specifically accepted by tribunals at
that time.123 Ultimately, the BIA concluded that a narrow duress defense
was consistent with the international refugee documents, and was therefore
the best permissible approach inasmuch as it fulfilled the purposes of the
Refugee Act.124
The Board then adopted a five-element test, which required an
individual seeking to establish eligibility for refugee protection
notwithstanding the persecutor bar to show that he or she:
(1) acted under an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily injury to himself or others; (2) reasonably believed
that the threatened harm would be carried out unless he
acted or refrained from acting; (3) had no reasonable
opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4)
did not place himself in a situation in which he knew or
reasonably should have known that he would likely be
forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) knew or
reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 517–23.
Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020).
Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018).
Id. at 353–57.
Id. at 357–58.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358–59.
Id. at 360.
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was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or
others.125
After articulating this “limited” defense, the BIA found that Negusie
himself did not qualify for a duress exception to the persecutor bar, both
because he had overstated the actual threat of death he faced and because he
likely had an opportunity to escape before he did.126 It appeared that the
BIA had allowed a duress defense with an extremely high standard.
Two years later, Attorney General Sessions certified Negusie to
himself for review and vacated the Board’s decision.127 Sessions, “seeking
to avoid collateral consequences that would be detrimental to the
administration of immigration law, and weighing the diplomatic
implications of this decision,” concluded that the persecutor bar does not
include a duress exception.128 He focused on the history of the statutory
provision, and reasoned that it made much more sense to read the
persecutor bar in the Refugee Act in the same manner that it had been
interpreted previously in the DPA.129 Notably, Sessions latched on to the
precise problem that Professor Evans highlighted. Indeed, convincingly
argued that the DPA was intended to incorporate the provisions of the IRO
Convention in the same manner that the Refugee Act was intended to
incorporate the provisions of the Refugee Convention, and that Fedorenko
was wrongly decided. However, Sessions took the opposite approach and
used Fedorenko to suggest that the DPA had no duress exception to the
persecutor bar, and that the best interpretation was to find that Congress
intended the same when it enacted the Refugee Act.130 This approach
ignores the international law origins of refugee protection.
Sessions further reasoned that because Congress had legislated
against the backdrop of Fedorenko and reenacted the persecutor bar as part
of 1996 legislation after the BIA had clearly held no duress exception
existed, that Congress’s intention was to enact a persecutor bar with no
duress defense.131 He went on to observe that other provisions in the INA
made explicit exceptions for involuntary acts, and that the absence of one in
the persecutor bar was conclusive regarding congressional intent.132 In this
sense, he rejected the notion that Congress intended to legislate in
conformity with international agreements in favor of a view that a duress
125. Id. at 363. The BIA recognized that this is a more limited exception than the
United States Supreme Court “presumed” to be accurate in United States v. Dixon, which
included only the first four elements. Id. at 363–64. The fifth element, which requires a
proportionality analysis, was derived from international law. Id.
126. Id. at 368.
127. Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020).
128. Id. at 121.
129. Id. at 132.
130. Id. at 133.
131. Id. at 133–34.
132. Id. at 134–35.
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exception could only exist if Congress translated its intent to specific
statutory language. Sessions attacked the broadly held view that the 1951
Convention included an implicit duress exception for the same reason.133
Specifically, he emphasized that the lack of an explicit duress exception in
the Convention, coupled with the fact that it merely required that States
have “serious reasons” for believing prohibited conduct occurred, meant
that no such duress exception existed.134 In this regard, Session
misconstrued the protective purpose of the humanitarian convention
framework.
There should be no doubt that the restrictionist impulse repeatedly
demonstrated by Sessions in the decisions he issued as Attorney General
and his public remarks is at odds with the intent of the drafters of
international refugee agreements and the 1980 Refugee Act. The goal of the
international community when it drafted the IRO Constitution, the 1951
Convention, and the 1967 Protocol, and the goal of the United States
Congress when it passed the 1980 Refugee Act was to protect human rights
and ensure protection for the persecuted. While divergent interpretations
will always be possible, that historical intent is manifest and should guide
the United States understanding of refugee protection. Indeed, that was
evident to the United States Supreme Court when it decided CardozaFonseca, and while the Court did not demonstrate the same level of
certainty in Aguirre-Aguirre, the purpose of Congress in passing the 1980
Refugee Act was clear nonetheless.135
In a recent development that provides some hope for a return to an
interpretation of the persecutor bar more in line with international
obligations and Congressional intent, Attorney General Garland vacated
Sessions’s 2020 decision in Negusie in late 2021.136 Garland referred the
case to himself for reconsideration, thereby automatically staying the BIA’s
2018 decision.137 This development provides an opportunity for Garland to
either restore the BIA’s limited duress exception,138 offer a different
rationale for overruling the BIA, or perhaps articulate a less restrictive
exception.
Most important for the argument advanced in this Article, Attorney
General Garland’s decision to restore a duress exception to the persecutor
bar would also open the path for an important argument by analogy.
Specifically, if an implicit duress exception to the persecutor bar exists,
there is a high likelihood that courts would also find an implicit duress
exception to the serious nonpolitical crime bar. Where the persecutor bar is
roughly imported from the Exclusion Clause Article 1F(a), and arguably
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 399 (A.G. 2021).
Id.
Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018).
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1F(c), the serious nonpolitical crime bar is imported verbatim from Article
1F(b),139 and there is a compelling argument for why a duress exception
should also be read into that bar. This is a necessary step if refugees like
Kevin have any hope of refugee protection in the United States, and that is
the focus of the final section of this Article.
IV. A DURESS DEFENSE TO THE SERIOUS NONPOLITICAL CRIME BAR
The UNHCR, refugee law scholars, and States party to the Refugee
Convention have found that the Article 1F exclusions, including the serious
nonpolitical crime bar, include an implicit duress exception. This is the
prevailing interpretation of international refugee law, and the United States
should interpret United States asylum law to align with this obligation as
Congress intended. While it is uncommon for Congress to explicitly align
United States law with international law obligations, when it does so
unequivocally, it is the constitutional responsibility of the Executive and
United States courts to respect the legislature’s desire. When they fail to do
so, they undermine the relationship between the three branches of
government established in the United States Constitution and thereby
degrade the rule of law in the United States. Moreover, Congress’s intent to
create a framework for United States refugee protection consistent with the
international framework is important for the global protection of refugees.
The Refugee Convention envisions a multilateral approach to protecting
refugees and has currently been ratified by nearly 150 countries.140 The
United States is a world leader in refugee protection, and it is particularly
important for the integrity of this global system of protection that the
United States lives up to its international commitments.
While the serious nonpolitical crime bar is derived from the Article
1F exclusion clauses in the same manner as the persecutor bar, for purposes
of this discussion, it is important to highlight two meaningful differences.
First, where the persecutor bar enjoyed a pedigree that preceded the 1951
Refugee Convention,141 the serious nonpolitical crime bar was incorporated
into U.S. law for the first time with the 1980 Refugee Act to ensure
compliance with Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention.142 Unlike the
persecutor bar, which was found not to have a duress defense in its previous
iterations,143 the serious nonpolitical crime bar has only existed in its
contemporary form and Congress always intended the statutory bar to
comport with the 1951 Refugee Convention. Second, while it is generally
139. Refugee Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(F)(b).
140. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, https://www.unhcr.org/protect/
PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2FB-B4CG] (stating that as of April 2015
there are 148 States Parties to one or both of the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol).
141. See Evans, supra note 112, at 511, 515–17.
142. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
143. See Fedorenko v. United States, 499 U.S. 490 (1981).
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accepted that the persecutor bar was derived from Article 1F(a) of the
Refugee Convention, the language of the exclusion clause and the
persecutor bar are quite different.144 In the case of the serious nonpolitical
crime bar, Congress used the precise language from Article 1F(b) of the
Refugee Convention to codify the bar in the INA.145 This provides
compelling evidence that Congress intended the serious nonpolitical crime
bar under United States law to reflect precisely the 1F(b) exclusion in the
Convention.
The UNHCR Handbook provides persuasive interpretations of
Refugee Convention provisions. While the Supreme Court held that the
UNHCR Handbook is not binding on United States immigration authorities
in Aguirre-Aguirre, it recognized the source as persuasive authority.146 The
Handbook notes that exclusion of criminals was a new feature of refugee
law in the post-war era, and this related mainly to the desire to exclude war
criminals from protection and protect States parties from other threats to
public safety.147 Specifically with regard to Article 1F(b) exclusion, the
Handbook emphasizes that only serious crimes should be included, and
“[m]inor offences punishable by moderate sentences are not grounds for
exclusion.”148
While it is not the goal of this Article to impugn the United States’s
serious nonpolitical crime bar jurisprudence as a general matter, it is clear
that the United States has interpreted the bar more broadly than the
UNHCR deems appropriate. Regardless of types of crimes that
appropriately trigger the bar, the Handbook cautions that “[i]n evaluating
the nature of the crime presumed to have been committed, all the relevant
factors—including any mitigating circumstances—must be taken into
account.”149 This line in the Handbook is further elaborated in the UNHCR
144. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (precluding
from refugee protection any noncitizen who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution” of any person on account of “race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”), with Refugee Convention,
supra note 14, art. 1(F)(a) (excluding from refugee protection any noncitizen who “has
committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes”).
145. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (setting forth the bar for
asylum and withholding or removal, respectively, for any noncitizen for whom “there are
serious reasons for believing that the alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime”).
146. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999) (“The U.N. Handbook may be
a useful interpretative aid, but it is not binding on the Attorney General, the BIA, or United
States courts.”).
147. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 147–48, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-statusunder-1951-convention.html
[https://perma.cc/K6X9-M8LE]
[hereinafter
UNHCR
Handbook].
148. Id. at 155.
149. Id. at 157.
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Guidelines on International Protection No. 5, which specifically examines
the applicability of the Article 1F Exclusion Clauses.150
The UNHCR Guidelines No. 5 emphasize the importance of
applying the 1F Exclusion Clauses “with great caution and only after a full
assessment of the individual circumstances of the case,” demanding that
they should “always be interpreted in a restrictive manner.”151 The UNHCR
Guidelines therefore reiterate the point made in the UNHCR Handbook that
States not lose sight of the humanitarian goals of the Convention, and that
they have a responsibility to protect all those who are deserving after an
individualized review. In this regard, the Guidelines focus on the need to
establish individual responsibility for the crimes in question,152 and that
“factors generally considered to constitute defenses to criminal
responsibility should be considered” when applying the Article 1F
exclusion clauses.153 “As for duress,” says the UNHCR Guidelines:
This applies where the act in question results from the
person concerned necessarily and reasonably avoiding a
threat of imminent death, or of continuing or imminent
serious bodily harm to him- or herself or another person,
and the person does not intend to cause greater harm than
the one sought to be avoided.154
In the Guidelines, which are included as an appendix to the Handbook, the
UNHCR specifically relies on its Background Note on the Application of
the Exclusion Clauses.155 The UNHCR Background Note, for its part, takes
into account State practice, UNHCR’s experience, the travaux
préparatoires of relevant international instruments, and the opinions of
various expert commentators.156 The Background Note reinforces the
insights in the Guidelines cited above and adds that “consideration should
be given as to whether the individual could reasonably have been expected
simply to renounce his or her membership, and indeed whether he or she
should have done so earlier if it was clear that the situation in question
would arise.”157 There are, therefore, “stringent conditions” for the
150. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 5,
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/05 (Sept. 4, 2003), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
publications/legal/3f7d48514/guidelines-international-protection-5-application-exclusionclauses-article.html [https://perma.cc/TPB2-NZEJ] [hereinafter Guidelines].
151. Id. at 2.
152. Id. at 18.
153. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1 (referring to U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Background Note on the
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees (Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Background Note]).
156. Background Note, supra note 155, at 2.
157. Id. at 26 (detailed in ¶ 70).
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application for the duress defense.158 There is no question, however, that
such a defense does exist under international refugee law.
As the entity charged with the interpretation and supervision of
compliance with the terms of the Refugee Convention, this UNHCR
authority is particularly persuasive. Moreover, renowned refugee and
asylum scholars have also concluded that duress is a viable defense to the
Article 1F Exclusion Clauses.159 James Hathaway, for his part, states that
duress:
[R]ecognizes the absence of intent where an individual is
motivated to perpetrate the act in question only in order to
avoid grave and imminent peril. The danger must be such
that a reasonable man would apprehend that he was in such
imminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to
choose the right and refrain from the wrong. Moreover the
predicament must not be of the making or consistent with
the will of the person seeking to invoke this exception.
Most important, the harm inflicted must not be in excess of
that which would otherwise have been directed at the
person alleging coercion.160
Additionally, States party to the Refugee Convention recognize the
existence of a duress exception to the Article 1F exclusion clauses. Courts
in Australia,161 Canada,162 England,163 Germany,164 and New Zealand165
158. Id. (detailed in ¶ 69).
159. See Geoff Gilbert, Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses,
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES 33 (2001), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3b3702152.
pdf [https://perma.cc/X2BM-833B]; see also JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE
STATUS 218–20 (Anne Lynas Shah ed., 1991).
160. HATHAWAY, supra note 159, at 218.
161. SHCB v Minister for Immigr and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003]
FCA 229 (Austl.) (considering a duress defense for an officer in the Afghani government
who had participated in human rights crimes); see also YYMT and FRFJ [2010] AATA 447
(Austl.) (finding an individual charged under Article 1F(b) will have a duress defense to the
charge and the opportunity to negate criminal responsibility); VWYJ v Minister for Immigr
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 658 (Austl.) (considering a duress
defense for an applicant who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity).
162. See Cabellero v. Canada (MCI), [1996] F.C. 291 (finding applicant committed
“crimes against humanity,” but could avail himself of a duress defense if “he was himself in
danger of imminent harm, the evil threatened him was, on balance, greater than the evil
inflicted on his victims and that he was not responsible for his own predicament”); Ramirez
v. Canada (MCI), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (Can.) (finding that there must be a finding of voluntary
complicity, active personal involvement, and shared common purpose in order to apply the
exclusion clause on the basis of alleged participation with a terrorist organization, and that
this approach was consistent with international and domestic law); see also Maan v. Canada
(MCI), [2007] F.C. 583 (Can. Ont.) (finding that a man who had trafficked drugs under
threat to himself and his family lacked the mens rea for the commission of the crime, thus no
crime had occurred, and the exclusion ground did not apply).
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have all found it appropriate to consider a duress defense to the application
of the exclusion clauses. As a matter of international law, the widespread
recognition among prominent States party to the Refugee Convention that
apply the international framework to the adjudication of asylum application
is significant for two reasons. First, it strongly suggests that it is appropriate
to read an implicit duress exception into Article 1F of the Refugee
Convention in a manner consistent with UNHCR guidance. Second, it
suggests that a norm of customary international law has emerged that
requires such a duress exception.
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States provides that customary international law “results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation.”166 The same source provides that customary international
law is the law of the United States and should be applied by federal courts
in certain circumstances.167 Moreover, a prominent line of jurisprudence
urges federal courts to interpret statutory ambiguities in a manner consistent
with customary international law, and the Charming Betsy rule of statutory
interpretation is named for the first such case.168 The fact that various
jurisdictions applying the Refugee Convention to resolve protection claims
in domestic courts have found that Article 1F includes an implicit duress
exception suggests “a general and consistent practice of states,” which is
the first prong of the test for a customary international law norm.169 The
second is that states apply the norm out of “a sense of legal obligation.”170
A review of the cited cases suggests that the states in question read the
163. See Regina v. Abdul-Hussain, (1999) Crim. L.R. 570 (Ct. App.) (UK)
(considering a duress defense for Iraqi applicants who hijacked a plane to escape the
country); see also AB v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2016] UKUT 00376 (IAC)
(considering a duress defense for an Iranian women’s prison guard found to have committed
crimes against humanity).
164. See Case No. 72XII77, Antonin L. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 80 I.L.R. 673
(Bavarian Higher Administrative Court (BayVGH), 7 June 1979) (accepting a duress
defense in the case of an applicant who had hijacked the plane to flee the then
Czechoslovakia to escape persecution for his political opinions), as referenced in Gilbert,
supra note 159.
165. Refugee Appeal No. 74646 [2003] NZRSAA 261 (finding that a man detained by
the Sri Lankan Army and forced to work was excused from criminal activity because he
acted under duress).
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN REL. L. OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (AM. L. INST.
1987).
167. Id. § 111(1), (3), reporters’ notes 1, 3 (stating that “[i]nternational law . . . [is] law
of the United States,” and that “[c]ourts in the United States are bound to give effect to
international law”).
168. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (finding that “[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decisions, resort must be had to customs and usages of
civilized nations.”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN REL. L. OF THE U.S. at § 102(2).
170. Id.
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Article 1F criminal exclusions to include a duress defense out of a sense of
legal obligation.
Australia provides one such example specifically in the context of
the serious nonpolitical crime bar. Like the United States Supreme Court in
Cardoza-Fonseca, The High Court of Australia has confirmed that
Australian refugee law should be interpreted in a manner consistent with
Australia’s international obligations.171 In YYMT and FRFJ, an Australian
court found that Article 1F(b) required it “to refer to the law of Australia or
of a particular country where the acts were committed,” and “consider any
defences that are available to those countries to the relevant offences under
their domestic law.”172 The Court found that Article 1F(b) used the word
“commit,” and that notions of criminal culpability, including duress, should
apply.173 As such, Australia clearly understood that it had a legal obligation
to consider a duress defense to the application of Article 1F(b) because the
core question posed by the exclusion clause related to criminal culpability,
and Australian law provided a duress defense to such questions.
The analysis in YYMT and FRFJ resonates with an argument
advanced by Professor Fatma Marouf that common law defenses should be
read into the INA.174 Professor Marouf convincingly argues that a duress
defense should apply to serious nonpolitical crime cases because that bar is
derived from principles of culpability under international criminal law,
which include common law defenses, and such defenses are part of the
body of customary international law.175 Moreover, Professor Marouf relies
on the abovementioned UNHCR guidance as well as the persecutor bar
jurisprudence establishing a duress exception to emphasize the propriety of
establishing an exception to the serious nonpolitical crime bar under United
States law.176
The foregoing provides an abundance of evidence that the serious
nonpolitical crime bar should be interpreted to include an implicit duress
exception. Congress intended that U.S. law comport with the Refugee
Convention, and all authoritative interpretations of Article 1F provide that a
duress exception to the exclusion clauses is implicit.177 This is the
conclusion of the UNHCR in a range of interpretive documents, including
171. See Minister for Immigr. and Ethnic Affairs v. Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273,
287 (Austl.) (holding that “[w]here a statute or subordinate legislation is ambiguous, the
courts should favour that construction which accords with Australia’s obligations under a
treaty or international convention to which Australia is a party, at least in those cases in
which the legislation is enacted after, or in contemplation of, entry into, or ratification of, the
relevant international instrument”).
172. YYMT and FRFJ [2010] AATA 447, ¶ 135 (Austl.).
173. Id. at ¶ 123.
174. Fatma Marouf, Invoking Federal Common Law Defenses in Immigration Cases,
66 UCLA L. REV. 142, 186–90 (2019); see also Elizabeth Keyes, Duress in Immigration
Law, 44 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 307, 345–49 (2021).
175. Marouf, supra note 174, at 185.
176. Id. at 186–87.
177. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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the Handbook,178 Guidelines,179 and a Background Note,180 and this
conclusion finds ample support in the writings of international refugee law
scholars.181 Finally, numerous jurisdictions that directly apply the Refugee
Convention framework in the adjudication of requests for refugee
protection agree that a duress exception is implicit. While those
jurisdictions do not necessarily rely on UNHCR guidance, like Professor
Marouf, they understand that Article 1F requires an assessment of criminal
culpability and that such assessments require the consideration of a duress
defense.
No precedent decision of any United States Court to date has
precluded a duress defense to the serious nonpolitical crime bar, and two
courts have suggested such a defense may exist. In Matter of E-A-, the BIA
considered whether coercion could limit liability for a serious nonpolitical
crime,182 thereby suggesting a possible interpretation of the bar that would
permit forced recruits into criminal gangs, like Kevin Euceda, to secure
refugee protection. However, the Board did not set forth a specific analysis
that should be applied to make this determination. Moreover, it cited
Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, which stands out as the one published case by a
United States Court of Appeals to seriously consider a duress defense to the
serious nonpolitical crime bar.183 There, the Sixth Circuit found former
gang members were eligible for refugee protection but that the applicant
was barred from such protection because he committed a serious
nonpolitical crime—namely, extortion on behalf of the gang.184 In that case,
the Sixth Circuit considered and rejected a duress defense because UrbinaMejia carried a weapon and shared the profits of his extortion, which
suggested that he had a “fair amount of autonomy.”185
The extensive UNHCR guidance cited above, the writings of
refugee law scholars, and case law from other Refugee Convention
jurisdictions all suggest a framework for the consideration of a duress
defense. While it is true that a finding of an applicant’s “fair amount of
autonomy” may undermine a duress defense, a comprehensive framework
must be established under United States law. As the BIA did in Negusie, it
must elaborate a complete duress defense to the serious nonpolitical crime
bar, and that defense must conform with international refugee law, as was
the intention of Congress when it passed the 1980 Refugee Act. The context
of Kevin’s case makes clear that he acted under threat of death, his crimes
were not more severe than the harm he faced at the hands of MS-13, and he
seized his first reasonable opportunity to escape and seek protection in the
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See UNHCR Handbook, supra note 147.
See Guidelines, supra note 150.
Id.
See Marouf, supra note 174, at 185–87.
E-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A. 2012).
Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 363–67 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 369.
Id. at 363.
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United States. Had a duress defense been clearly available to Kevin under
the law, he may have won protection, and he would be with us today.
CONCLUSION
When Kevin first arrived in the United States, he was detained as
an unaccompanied minor by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”),
then transferred to adult detention on his eighteenth birthday. It was clear
he would meet resistance to his claim for refugee protection because of his
prior gang membership and criminal activity. However, the fact that MS-13
had forcibly recruited him and compelled him to participate in its criminal
enterprise under threat of death gave hope that United States authorities
would view him as a refugee in need of protection. Unfortunately for
Kevin, the BIA has yet to find a duress exception to the serious nonpolitical
crime bar, and in the absence of clear guidance, Kevin’s asylum case
languished because of the government’s desire to keep him out of the
United States.
Congress intended that the serious nonpolitical crime bar under
United States asylum law have the same meaning and scope as the 1F(b)
Refugee Convention exclusion clause. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that it was the intent of Congress to not only replicate the language of
the provisions of the Refugee Convention in United States law, but to
incorporate the full extent of the meaning of such language and bring the
United States into compliance with its treaty obligations. Accordingly,
when Congress reproduced exactly the language of the Article 1F(b)
exclusion clause in the INA, it intended for that provision of United States
law to have the same meaning, scope, and limitations as Article 1F(b). The
UNHCR, international refugee law experts, and national jurisdictions that
apply the provisions of the Refugee Convention in asylum adjudications
agree that Article 1F(b) includes a duress exception, and United States
authorities should find that the same exception exists under United States
asylum law. The United States government’s failure to abide by
congressional intent in applying statutory law contravenes the balance of
power envisioned by the Constitution and undermines the rule of law as a
result domestically and globally.
The continued failure on the part of the BIA to recognize a duress
defense to the serious nonpolitical crime bar under United States law has
real life repercussions. The consequences of this failure for Kevin,
specifically his protracted suffering in immigration detention and ultimate
deportation and death, will certainly befall other asylum seekers until the
government takes affirmative steps to correctly interpret and apply the law.
Kind-hearted, compassionate people like Kevin are often manipulated by
their persecutors and compelled to carry out bad acts. The criminal law, on
the national and international levels, comprehends this and provides
defenses such as duress so that criminal liability reflects this reality. It is
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counterintuitive to suspend this well-settled understanding of criminal
liability in the refugee protection context, and to continue to do so will
result in more refugees returned to their death.

